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An Objection against the Identity Argument*
Abstract:
The question which moral status the embryo has is of great practical signiﬁcance because
the possibility to justify a governmental prohibition of a set of important therapeutical
and scientiﬁc measures depends on a special and therefore legal protectable status of the
embryo. The identity argument which is often used in this context cannot constitute this
status due to its mere epistemic character under the condition of the determinism.
At an early stage of the discussion, Kliemt (1979) has pointed out that govern-
mental interventions into private decisions of the citizens concerning the subject
of human reproduction can very well cause moral complications and therefore
do require justiﬁcation. From the point of view of constitutional law, such in-
terventions may even require the fulﬁllment of very strict conditions, since the
affected constitutional rights—for instance the right of reproductive autonomy
that can be deduced from the general personal rights (Koppernock 1997), or the
freedom of science that is granted without any reservation—in general have a
high status. Furthermore, in a pluralistic society and in a philosophically and re-
ligiously neutral state that has been prescribed by the German constitution (see
Huster 2002), such limitations of liberties need reasons that are not only based
on mere individual or groups’ beliefs and convictions but that are accessible for
the general public (see Huster 1997; Beck 2006, 173ff.).
In this context, the question of the moral status of the fertilised prenatal
human ovum—below: the embryo—is of paramount interest. This question is
practically relevant, since the possibility to justify a state prohibition of a whole
set of important therapeutic and scientiﬁc measures—from abortion and pre-
implantation diagnostics to stem cell research—depends on a special status of
the embryo that is thus worthy of special legal protection. Furthermore, the
embryo’s political, legal and philosophical status is highly controversial.
* I want to thank Susanne Beck, Alena Buyx, Thomas Schramme and Ursula Wolf for their inspi-
rations and objections.442 Stefan Huster
1. The Status Discussion in Reverse
In bioethics, we have a broad and sophisticated discussion on the embryo’s sta-
tus. These bioethical arguments have often been seized in other contexts. Typi-
cally, four arguments are being distinguished in order to support a moral sta-
tus of the embryo: (1) continuity, (2) species membership, (3) potentiality, and
(4) identity (see also Damschen and Schönecker 2003). Whereas the argument
of continuity is very popular in public but suffers from factual weakness (see
Merkel 2002, 157ff.),1 the persuasiveness of the other arguments is still highly
controversial. Although probably none of the arguments (2) to (4) will be strong
enough to base a special status of the embryo on it, it is less obvious that ar-
guments (2), (3) and (4) taken together will not have moral relevance:2 At ﬁrst
sight, it is not quite implausible that an entity that can be identiﬁed as an in-
dividual and that is a member of the human species and has the potential to
develop into a grown-up human being, will possess a special status. Here and
now it does not need to be determined whether this special status should alrea-
dy be a stringent protection of life and dignity or merely a week obligation of
solidarity, a feeling of piety or any other vague obligation.3
It is striking that the discussion is mainly ‘forward looking’: namely towards
the commonalities of the embryo with the born human being and its develop-
ment in this direction. The ‘reverse’ of the discussion enjoys considerably less
attention, namely the dissociation from pre-forms of the embryo, i.e. the sperm
cell and the (unfertilised) ovum or oocyte (but see Leist 1990, 85ff.). Insofar, the
earliest point of time for a special status of the embryo is totally undisputed: this
is the fusion of ovum and sperm cell. Arguments that distinguish between ‘hu-
man life’ and ‘(human) persons’, whereas they grant (full) moral status only to
the latter, are also based on the supposition—and take this as self-evident—that
human life begins with this fusion (cf. Hoerster 2002, 37f.). If not only vague fee-
lings of respect but clear moral obligations are linked to this point of time, one
needs a casuistic distinction when the exact time of fusion actually is.4
2. The Determination of the Genetic Identity as Reason
for the Relevance of the Fusion
Especially for the proponents of the continuity argument the fusion is a crucial
break: Their distinctive argument is that the fusion is the only relevant break
1 Nevertheless, this argument is interesting in one respect; cf. below section 4.
2 The necessity for such an overview is conceded also by the proponents of this argument (cf. Hon-
nefelder 2002, 91).
3 Such a weaker obligation regarding the early embryo is proposed—with many differences in sin-
gular aspects—by Hoerster (2002, 109ff.) and Merkel (2002, 184ff.). In the judicial discussion, the
concept of a graded protection is widely proposed; see Dreier 2002a, 377ff., and Hilgendorf 1996,
758ff.. For aspects of medical ethics, see the summaries in Wagner-Westerhausen 2008, 6ff..
4 Cf. the discussions on the pre-nucleus stage, like in Honnefelder 2002, 96f..Cognitive Limits and the Beginning of Life 443
whereas all other propositions for the beginning of the moral status are arbitra-
ry. But what is the actual feature of the fusion?
It cannot be the species afﬁliation, since apparently ovum and sperm cell are
also ‘human material’. Similarly, the reference to the potentiality of the fertili-
sed ovum is not convincing, since ovum and sperm cell also have the potential
to develop towards a human being—even though only collectively (see also Har-
ris 1995, 39; 2007, 97 and 166; and Warnock 1990, 230). Hence, typically the
identity argument is being referred to: With the fusion, a new individual being
has come into existence that is said to be identical with the human being who is
later being born.
For this argument, a reference to the weak concept of purely numerical iden-
tity is not valid: This is since in this spirit I am not only identical to ‘my’ embryo
but also to ‘my’ ovum and ‘my’ sperm cell, in any case I have emerged from and
consist of ‘my’ ovum and ‘my’ sperm cell.5 Well, it might be argued that typically
no one will know which ovum and which sperm cell will become a human being,
which means that the promise of moral protection will prove irrelevant. But this
argument will at least be invalid if we have a controlled in vitro fertilisation—in
this case, ovum and sperm cell can easily be identiﬁed. Nevertheless, hitherto
no one has claimed a special status of ovum and sperm cell prior to their fusion,
a status that would prohibit their destruction or experimental utilisation.
Hence, quite often—and particularly in discussions of constitutional law—it
is being referred to the determination of the genetical identity by way of the
fusion: “The individual unique genome is already ﬁxed: the genetic identity of
the human being.”6 In this account, the fusion is the correct but also earliest
possible beginning of protection, since with the fusion a human life newly enters
the world, a life that is becoming individual in this very moment by the genetic
determination.
3. The Epistemic Character of the Identity Argument
At ﬁrst sight, this identity argument is very feasible since here the worthiness
of protection is linked to a simple biological fact: the formation of individual
human life at the time of the fusion deﬁning the genetic identity. Hence the fer-
tilised ovum is legally different from the oocyte and the sperm cell: Indeed, until
5 There is a possible objection against that insofar as we merely have a material but not a numerical
identity, since oocyte and sperm cell are two things that are identiﬁable in time and space (see
also Quante 2002, 85). But this objection cannot concern the argument of the proponents of the
identity argument: They can not only refer to the numerical identity in this sense, since the
fertilised ovum should be granted a special status even in the pre-nucleus stage. This is because
it is surely numerically identical to the later person.
6 Isensee 2002, 58: “Fixiert ist schon das individuelle, als solches einzigartige Genom: die genetische
Identität des Menschen.” Similar Kirchhof 2002, 21: “[...] erfasst der Lebensschutz bereits das
befruchtete Ei, mit dem die Entwicklung des Menschen in seiner abschließenden genetischen
Prägung und der dadurch begründeten Individualität beginnt.”444 Stefan Huster
the moment of nuclear fusion, t1, everything could have taken another way;7 a
being with the genetic code Y instead of code X could have developed, had the
DNA strands arranged in a different way. To say it simpler: Prior to moment
t1 the individual Y could still have developed instead of individual X. The life
of individual X starts at moment t1 which is the moment of the determination
of his genetic code. In order to understand this there is no need to claim that
the human being is determined by his genes or something like that. Barring the
particular case of monozygotic twins, genetic ﬁtting apparently remains a good
and nowadays even the primary criterion for individuation, even if other factors
are acknowledged as inﬂuencing the personality development.8 Furthermore,
the fusion argument is advantageous for the proponents of the embryo’s moral
status, since it is not contrary to but seems to be supported by biological cogni-
tion: It is the understanding of modern genetics that has granted us an insight
into the development of the genetic identity in the process of nuclear fusion.9
However, if biological research should discover that the genetic individuality is
determined at a later point of time, that would also push the beginning of a
moral status to a later point of time, with respect to this reasoning.10
But what is the meaning of statements like ‘until the moment of nuclear
fusion everything could have taken another way’ or ‘prior to moment t1 the indi-
vidual Y could still have developed instead of individual X’? The crucial question
is what the word ‘could’ in these sentences means. In which respect is the indi-
viduality being determined after t1 but undetermined prior to t1? Let’s imagine
the situation some hours prior to the nuclear fusion (t1¡n), the time when the
sperm cells are moving towards the oocyte. At ﬁrst sight, it looks like we are far
away from any kind of individuation: It is neither clear which sperm cell will
‘win the race’, nor is it determined in which way the DNA strands will arrange
around each other.
However, this is the very perspective that we use to take automatically. But
let’s instead assume for a while that the situation at t1¡n is being looked at by a
being with complete knowledge of the (relevant) world at the moment t1¡n, with
complete knowledge of natural laws and with unlimited calculating capacities. If
the world is deterministically closed, it has all to commend it that already at the
moment t1¡n, this Laplace-demon will have knowledge of the genetic individua-
lity of the embryo that is just developing. This is because he can apply natural
7 Of course, not everything could have taken another way, since the existing genetic material deli-
mits a ceiling: Never can a dog emerge from the oocyte and the sperm cell of two cats. But all this
does not change the fact that—in a certain sense that still has to be deﬁned—the individual cat is
not yet determined.
8 Hence, the following argument is too strict in Dreier 2002b, 24f..
9 Cf. the arguments in Kongregation für Glaubenslehre 1987: “Von dem Augenblick an, in dem
die Eizelle befruchtet wird, beginnt ein neues Leben [...]. Die neuere Genetik bestätigt diesen
Sachverhalt, der schon immer eindeutig war [...], in eindrucksvoller Weise.”
10 I owe this important hint to a contribution of Peter Dabrock. As it is well-known, the nuclear
fusion is in fact not that simple, since even after the fertilisation multiples or genetic modiﬁcations
can develop (on the moral philosophical discussion see Stoecker 2003, 137ff.). These constraints
shall be ignored here for the sake of argument.Cognitive Limits and the Beginning of Life 445
laws to the initial conditions and calculate the embryo’s future development up
to moment t1 and beyond.11
It is more than improbable that human beings will ever be capable of this
kind of calculation. However, this kind of thought experiment is helpful, since
it shows that the expression ‘everything could have taken another way’ in the
sentences above does not make any sense logically or by natural law but it is
epistemically meaningful. At the moment of t1¡n everything could have taken
another way (only) in the sense that ‘we’ are unable to predict the further de-
velopment; but physically the ﬁtting of the embryo was already determined at
this moment (see also Merkel 2001, 481). This means that it is due to the limits
of human cognitive capabilities that under the above conditions we say that the
individuality is undetermined at the moment t1¡n.12 The omniscient observer
already knows what will happen. All this is not totally unreal, since—compared
to early eras of human history, without any knowledge of molecular genetics—
nowadays we are in a comparable position.
4. Preconditions and Normative Conclusions
Based on these considerations, we now can rephrase the question how signiﬁ-
cant the fusion is for the status discussion: Can the determination of the moral
status of a being depend on the moment when we are able to determine the indi-
viduality? The answer is clear: No, the moment of cognition must be irrelevant,
since this moment depends on our (limited) human cognitive capabilities; for
the moral status, at best the moment can be relevant when the individuality is
in fact determined. Based on the identity argument, an opposing point of view
on that would consequently have to claim that the individuality and hence the
moral status of unborn life began even later in former times prior to the age of
molecular biology when we had no knowledge of DNA strands. But this is totally
implausible, and hence the proponents of the identity argument can today refer
to state-of-the-art biological knowledge.
What are the preconditions for and the conclusions of this argument? Of cour-
se the most vulnerable precondition is the strict determinism that is assumed
here. So, the objection is obvious that the ﬁndings of quantum mechanics show
that such a determinism does not exist, but that in the roam of very small partic-
les, at the most probability statements are possible. We do not want to go deeper
into this question here, especially since it is still not ﬁnally clear how these ﬁn-
dings should be interpreted.13 Thus, right from the start this argument would
not be touched if we merely claimed an epistemic indeterminism. The situation
would be quite different if indeed an ontological indeterminism were feasible.
11 In any case, this is valid until the moment when human decisions of free will come into play. It
may remain open whether or not they also are subject to the determinist principle.
12 See Dennett 1984, 144ff., who—in the cause of the discussion on free will—has interpreted the
famous ‘could have done otherwise’ as an epistemic notion.
13 From a philosophical point of view, see Honderich 1995, 92ff..446 Stefan Huster
But in this case our robust determinist common perception of natural processes
would require from the proponents of the identity argument to show whether
and how far the process of fusion is indeed an indeterminist one. As far as we
know, this has not yet happened. Anyway, it is more than questionable whether
the ethical discussion should shoulder this kind of baggage (see also Quante
2002, 48).
Furthermore, what is required is only a certain but quite self-evident concept
of natural processes: The biological process knows no breaks or caesuras that
are meaningful in themselves. It is a slow and calm ﬂow, a continuum where one
event just follows the other.14 None of these events has a special signiﬁcance
by itself. If we talk of breaks, caesuras etc., these are just interpretations based
on our capacities to cognize by pointing to especially apparent events within
this continual process. Of course, such interpretations are totally inevitable if
we want to give names to events and if we want to ‘arrange’ the world.15 It is
practically meaningful for our life that we only call a tree blossoming as soon as
we can perceive the ﬁrst bud—even as we know that the chain of causes that has
inevitably led to this event has started long before we could see the ﬁrst bud.
It is important that these interpretations are meaningful only in this prag-
matic sense. It has nothing to commend—and this is the normative consequence
of this argument—to give moral signiﬁcance to these interpretations, unless
they are based on moral grounds right from the beginning. Ever since we ha-
ve known about the contexts of molecular biology, the nuclear fusion of oocyte
and sperm cell is also an event that immediately comes to mind as the moment
from which on we speak of a new individual human life. Even if we accept the—
disputed—premise that every human being in itself possesses a special moral
status, the nuclear fusion alone does not have a normative consequence at all.
This is because it is not ‘nature’ that throws an individual being into the world at
that moment; no, in this respect we just make a determination that is suggested
by our (current) cognitive capacities.16 In principle, there is nothing to be said
against even protecting the oocyte and sperm cell in a similar way, if and as far
as we know that by natural law they necessarily will develop into an individual
being—even if we do not yet know which being that will be. Hence, there is no
way to avoid the speciﬁc determination of the morally relevant moment, even if
we should grant such a special status to each and every human being as such.
But here we are not exempt from error if we take the biological descriptions
too literal or if we sneak in evaluations. Let’s ﬁnally look at the following argu-
ment in favour of fusion as the morally relevant moment. In the following way,
14 On a similar argument, see also Harris 1995, 40.
15 Quante (2002, 92) emphasises that, irrespective of moral disputes, the question about the be-
ginning of life cannot be answered purely from the point of view of natural sciences, but that it
requires “further metaphysical assumptions”.
16 Irrespected of moral questions, other conclusions regarding the beginning of life are well possible;
for example, the self-monitoring can be referred to, which starts a few days after the fertilisation
(see Quante 2002, 69ff.).Cognitive Limits and the Beginning of Life 447
the author distances himself from the thesis that other morally relevant breaks
do exist:
“Right from the beginning, the embryo is a human being. This ap-
plies from the moment of fertilisation on, which is itself a process
that starts with the penetration of the sperm cell into the oocyte and
which ends with the fusion of the cell nuclei. The fertilisation itself is
a continual sequence of events. One event is the precondition for the
following unfolding. Biologists indicate that it is just a human per-
ception to observe it as a process in stages: ‘The listing of singular
events is only caused by the degree of exactness of our observations.
Due to the fact that the fertilisation appears to us as a sequence of
events and reactions, the whole process has also been called ‘casca-
de of fertilisation.’ [...] But we have to see clearly that the described
stages of the cascade are the result of our terminological classiﬁca-
tions but not of reality. Every ‘stage’ is a continuous consequence of
the prior processes.’ [...] Every development stage continuously pas-
ses into the next one. There is no moment in the development of a
human being that could be called as the one moment when the em-
bryo becomes a human being. ‘Again and again people have tried to
make personhood start with the maturation of the brain. But the
differentiation of the nervous system is one of the best examples
for the fact that we cannot ﬁnd a singular moment when sudden-
ly something new emerges. Even the synaptogenesis is a continuous
process.’ [...]”17
We can accept all these statements but involuntarily we ask: Is there any ar-
gument here that a “continuous sequence of events” can be observed not even
prior to the nuclear fusion—especially as we talk about the “penetration of a
sperm cell into the oocyte” prior to the fusion of the nuclei? Why isn’t here also
17 See Lehmann 2002: “Der Embryo ist von Anfang an Mensch. Dies gilt von der Befruchtung an, die
selber einen Prozess darstellt, der mit dem Eindringen eines Spermiums in die Eizelle beginnt
und mit der Fusion der Zellkerne endet. Die Fertilisation selbst erfolgt als eine kontinuierliche
Abfolge von Ereignissen. Das eine Ereignis ist Voraussetzung für die folgende Entfaltung. Die Bio-
logen machen aufmerksam, dass es sich dabei um eine menschliche Wahrnehmung handelt, wenn
man einen stufenmäßigen Prozess dahinter sieht: ‘Die Aufzählung der Einzelereignisse wird le-
diglich von unserer Beobachtungsgenauigkeit bestimmt. Wegen des stufenartigen Erscheinungs-
bildes aufeinanderfolgender Reaktionen hat man den ganzen Vorgang auch als ‘Befruchtungs-
kaskade’ (H. M. Beier) bezeichnet. Es muss aber klar gesehen werden, dass die beschriebenen
Stufen der Kaskade Ergebnis unserer begrifﬂichen Abgrenzungen, nicht aber der Wirklichkeit
selbst sind. Jede ‘Stufe’ folgt kontinuierlich aus den vorausgegangenen Prozessen.’ (G. Rager, in:
Ärztliches Urteil und Handeln. Zur Grundlage einer medizinischen Ethik, hrsg. von L. Honne-
felder und G. Rager, Frankfurt 1994, 77) Jedes Entwicklungsstadium geht kontinuierlich in das
folgende über. Es gibt keinen Moment in der Entwicklung, an dem man sagen könnte, erst hier
werde der Embryo zum Menschen. ‘Es ist immer wieder versucht worden, das Menschsein mit der
Reifung des Gehirns beginnen zu lassen. Die Differenzierung des Nervensystems ist aber eines
der besten Beispiele dafür, dass sich kein Punkt festlegen lässt, an welchem sprunghaft etwas
Neues entsteht. Auch die Synaptogenese ist ein kontinuierlicher Prozess.’ (G. Rager, a.a.O., 346,
Anm. 52, vgl. genauer 89ff.)”448 Stefan Huster
“the listing of singular events only caused by the degree of exactness of our ob-
servations”? This is apparently inconsistent: Here, the continuity argument is
unilaterally ‘forward looking’, so that we can only come to the conclusion that se-
cretly the nuclear fusion is ﬁtted with a certain aura that is beyond the possible
biological observations. In former times this was called animation (Beseelung),
and the identity argument is only feasible on this basis. But this argument is
useless for the purpose of forming and interpreting the legal order in a plurali-
stic society.
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